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Experimental evidence suggests that emotions can both speed-up and slow-down the
internal clock. Speeding up has been observed for to-be-timed emotional stimuli that have
the capacity to sustain attention, whereas slowing down has been observed for to-be-
timed neutral stimuli that are presented in the context of emotional distractors. These
effects have been explained by mechanisms that involve changes in bodily arousal, atten-
tion, or sentience. A review of these mechanisms suggests both merits and difﬁculties
in the explanation of the emotion-timing link. Therefore, a hybrid mechanism involving
stimulus-speciﬁc sentient representations is proposed as a candidate for mediating emo-
tional inﬂuences on time. According to this proposal, emotional events enhance sentient
representations, which in turn support temporal estimates. Emotional stimuli with a larger
share in ones sentience are then perceived as longer than neutral stimuli with a smaller
share.
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INTRODUCTION
Beingabletotimeisessentialforarangeof tasksincludingdriving
a car, cooking a meal, or having a conversation (Schirmer, 2004;
Buhusi and Meck, 2005). Although we typically learn and com-
plete these tasks with little effort,there are instances in which cars
collide,mealsovercook,andconversationsdesynchronize.Thus,it
seems that, although accurate on average, our sense of time is not
ﬁxed but varies within and across individuals.
Prominent among the factors that inﬂuence our sense of time
are emotions (for reviews see Droit-Volet and Meck, 2007; Craig,
2009a; Droit-Volet and Gil,2009). Evidence for this comes from a
range of paradigms some of which will be shortly reviewed here.
One paradigm entails the presentation of stimuli for which par-
ticipants subsequently estimate or reproduce the duration. With
a few exceptions (e.g., Noulhiane et al., 2007), to-be-timed emo-
tional stimuli elicit longer estimates and reproduction times than
to-be-timed neutral stimuli (Angrilli et al.,1997; Noulhiane et al.,
2007; Doi and Shinohara, 2009). A second popular paradigm is
called duration bisection. In the training phase of this paradigm,
participantslearntodiscriminatetwoanchordurations,oneshort
andonelong.Inthetestphase,participantsperceiveprobestimuli
ranging in duration from the short to the long anchor and judge
whether these stimuli are more similar to the short or the long
anchor. Again, with a few exceptions (Gil et al., 2009; Droit-Volet
et al.,2010),emotional test stimuli are judged more similar to the
longanchorthanneutralstimuli(Effronetal.,2006;Giletal.,2007;
Grommetetal.,2011).Finally,researchershaveexaminedtherela-
tionship between emotion and subjective time using a duration
discrimination paradigm with intermediate emotional or neutral
distractors (Lui et al., 2011). Here participants are presented with
twosuccessivestimuli(i.e.,S1/S2)andindicatewhetherthesecond
stimuluswasshorterorlongerthantheﬁrst.Participantsaremore
likely to judge S2 as shorter when it was preceded by an emotional
as compared to neutral distractor.
Together, this literature conﬁrms the popular perception that
emotions both speed-up and slow-down our sense of time. More-
over, it suggests that emotional events are generally perceived as
longer than they really are, which may be conceptualized as a
speedingupofsubjectivetemporalpulses.Italsosuggeststhatneu-
traleventsoccurringinthecontextof adistracting,emotionalone
areperceivedasshorterthentheyreallyare,whichmaybeconcep-
tualizedasaslowingdownof subjectivetemporalpulses.Different
mechanisms have been proposed to explain these effects and the
remainder of this paper will focus on reviewing and contrasting
them.
AROUSAL MODULATES TIME
The ﬁrst mechanism draws on a popular timing model derived
from scalar expectancy theory (SET; Gibbon et al., 1984). This
model entails a clock stage comprising a pacemaker and an accu-
mulator,both of which are connected by a switch. The pacemaker
emitspulsesthatarecollectedbytheaccumulatorwhentheswitch
is in a closed state. Delayed closing or ﬂickering of the switch
causespulsestobelost(Penney,2003).Theclockstageisfollowed
by a memory stage. During this stage, pulses from the accumu-
lator enter working memory and are compared with previously
stored durations. The result of this comparison informs temporal
decisions and associated behavioral responses.
Research in both non-human animals and humans suggests
that bodily arousal affects timing at the clock stage. For exam-
ple, rats injected with the psychostimulant methamphetamine, a
drug which enhances dopaminergic activity, treat a given dura-
tion as longer than do rats injected with saline (Meck, 1983).
In contrast, rats injected with the dopamine antagonist haloperi-
dol treat the duration as shorter than do the control rats (Meck,
1983). In humans, changes in physiological arousal as assessed by
self-report and psychophysiological markers have been shown to
concur with changes in perceived time. Relative overestimations
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have been found in conjunction with a putative increase in bod-
ily arousal (Angrilli et al., 1997; Droit-Volet et al., 2011; Mella
et al., 2011), whereas relative underestimations have been found
with a putative decrease in bodily arousal (Wearden et al., 1999).
As these effects typically represent a simple shift in the timing
function,researchersassumethatarousalpositivelycorrelateswith
pacemaker rate. Moreover, because emotions frequently increase
physiological arousal, emotion effects on timing have been pro-
posed to be mediated by the arousal/pacemaker link (Droit-Volet
and Meck, 2007; Droit-Volet and Gil, 2009).
Although compelling, this proposal is not without problems.
First, the concept of arousal and its relationship to an internal
clock are poorly deﬁned. Implicit in the published work is the
understanding that arousal equates with sympathetic activation
as determined by increased heart-rate, breathing, or skin con-
ductance (e.g., Droit-Volet et al., 2011). However, this and other
possible conceptualizations are not clearly spelled out. Moreover,
it is assumed that this arousal somehow feeds back to the inter-
nal clock supported by the dopaminergic system. Yet, how this
feedback occurs is still unclear. Second, available evidence for a
relationship between emotional arousal and duration estimates is
at best indirect. Although studies have shown corresponding dif-
ferences in arousal measures and duration judgments elicited by
emotional versus neutral stimuli, they never actually correlated
the two at an individual or trial level. Moreover, even if such a
correlation were found, effects of arousal on attention and work-
ing memory (Brennan and Arnsten, 2008; Advokat, 2010) offer
an alternative causal link. Third, there appears to be a mismatch
between the time-course of emotion-induced arousal and timing
effectsreportedintheliterature.Thelatterhavebeenobservedpri-
marily for short stimuli (∼2–3s) and seem to dissipate for longer
stimuli (Noulhiane et al.,2007; Mella et al.,2011). In comparison,
emotion-induced increases in physiological arousal are relatively
sluggish with heart-rate and skin conductance taking between 3
and6stopeak(Bradleyetal.,2001;SchirmerandEscofﬁer,2010).
Moreover, heart-rate for example typically decreases for the ﬁrst
3sthroughparasympatheticactivation(Bradleyetal.,2001).Dur-
ing this time, one should observe a slow-down in time keeping if
heart-rateorsympatheticactivationtranslateintopacemakerrate.
Finally,the arousal model fails to fully accommodate existing data
(Droit-Volet and Meck, 2007; Droit-Volet and Gil, 2009). Not all
emotions lead to an increase in physiological parameters linked to
arousal (e.g., sadness; Levenson et al., 1990) but may nevertheless
elicit temporal overestimation (Lee et al.,2011). Furthermore,sit-
uations in which the timing stimulus is neutral, but presented in
the context of an emotionally arousing distractor, fail to produce
temporal overestimations (Lui et al.,2011). Given these problems,
the arousal/pacemaker link may not or may not fully explain the
relationship between emotions and time.
ATTENTION MODULATES TIME
A second putative mechanism by which emotions may shape our
experience of time is linked to the cognitive resources allocated to
stimulus processing. Two possibilities of how stimulus processing
may affect timing will be discussed here. The ﬁrst concerns the
amount of attention individuals dedicate to time. In reference to
the SET timing model,mentioned above,it assumes that the clock
stage (Macar et al.,1994; Droit-Volet,2003) and/or memory stage
(Buhusi and Meck, 2009) share attentional resources with other
ongoing mental processes such that greater resource allocation to
the temporal dimension of a stimulus results in fewer temporal
pulses being lost. Support for this notion comes from studies that
manipulated participant attention to time. For example, Macar
et al. (1994) presented participants with stimuli for which they
had to subsequently judge both duration and intensity. On some
trials,participantswerecuedtofocusallormostof theirattention
on the duration task, whereas on other trials, they were cued to
focusallormostoftheirattentionontheintensitytask.Compared
to the former, the latter trials were more likely to result in tem-
poral underestimations of the target suggesting that pulses from a
putative pacemaker were lost.
Inlinewiththis,someresearchersreportedunderestimationof
emotional relative to neutral stimuli in timing tasks. For example,
participants underestimated the duration of appetizing and dis-
gustingfoodpicturesrelativetoneutralfoodpicturesandthiswas
interpreted to reﬂect a diversion of attention from the temporal
dimensionof thepicturestotheiremotionaldimension(Giletal.,
2009). As such, the ﬁrst attentional mechanism introduced here
hassomeexplanatorypower.Moreover,unlikethearousalmecha-
nism,it makes clear statements as to the underlying processes and
has the advantage that temporal distortions can be explained by
processes occurring during rather than after temporal encoding.
Yet,its problem is that it discords with the overwhelming number
of studies that ﬁnd overestimation for emotional as compared to
neutral stimuli. Given the greater signiﬁcance of emotional rela-
tivetoneutralevents,theformershouldalways,notjustinthecase
of disgust,divert attention away from time and produce temporal
underestimations.
Asecondvariantofthecognitiveresourcemechanismaddresses
this problem. It assumes that it is the stimulus processing itself
that contributes to timing and that attentional resources directed
toward or away from the stimulus determine timing accuracy
(Hicks et al., 1977; Ornstein, 1997). This proposal ﬁts most over-
andunderestimationeffectsreportedintheliterature.Overestima-
tions of emotional relative to neutral stimuli could be explained
by the former recruiting more cognitive resources and having
greater ability to sustain attention than the latter. Underestima-
tions of neutral stimuli presented in an emotional as compared
to neutral context could be explained by the former being more
distracting than the latter, thereby leaving fewer resources for the
processing of the timing stimulus (Lui et al., 2011). Neverthe-
less,this proposal is not without problems. For example,it cannot
explainwhypresentationdurationsof appetizingfoodsareunder-
estimated relative to neutral foods (Gil et al., 2009) and, more
importantly, it conﬂicts with the evidence that attention to non-
temporal stimulus dimensions typically impairs timing (Macar
et al.,1994).
SENTIENT PROCESSING MODULATES TIME
A third proposal for how emotions inﬂuence time evokes the
concept of sentience – often equated with being aware or con-
scious of one’s self (Craig, 2009a; Wittmann, 2009). Speciﬁcally,
it holds that external and internal sensory signals including infor-
mation from the muscles, skeletal system, and internal organs are
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integrated in the brain and enable self-awareness. As we expe-
rience ourselves across moments or time, the proposal makes
sentience the basis for temporal perception and the mediator in
the relationship between emotions and time. Emotion-induced
bodily changes, such as heart-rate decelerations or accelerations,
presumably increase sentience and thereby sensitivity to the pas-
sage of time. Different lines of theoretical and experimental work
substantiate this possibility.
Vierordt, a nineteenth century pioneer of timing research,
raised the “self” as a potential origin for the emergence of time
(Vierordt,1868). Furthermore,James (1981) argued for a reliance
of temporal perception on sensation and noted that perceived
durations tend to have an “emotional feeling.” He also famously
speculated about a critical role of bodily feedback for emotion.
Although heavily criticized at the time, recent emotion theory
has turned back to James and leveraged on his ideas. Important
with respect to the present paper is Damasio’s somatic marker
hypothesis, which holds that an emotional event triggers bodily
changes whose feedback to the brain critically contributes, not
just to the emotional experience, but also to the processing of
the event and event-related decision making (Damasio, 1996). In
extension of this, some researchers interested in the processing
of time now hold that there is a relationship between sentient
processing and subjective time (Effron et al., 2006; Craig, 2009a;
Wittmann, 2009).
Experimental support for this assertion is steadily accumulat-
ing.Forexample,researchershaveidentiﬁedacorrelationbetween
self-awarenessandtemporalestimates.Individualswhoareexper-
imentally deprived of visual, tactile, and/or auditory stimulation
and whose primary sensory experiences therefore come from
within report that the hours pass more slowly than usual (Schul-
man et al., 1967). Furthermore, it was demonstrated that both
bodilychangeandawarenessofone’scurrentbodilystatepositively
predict temporal estimates in interval-timing tasks (Meissner and
Wittmann, 2011). Individuals with a more pronounced decrease
in heart-rate during temporal encoding and a better accuracy at
guessing their own heart-rate were less likely to underestimate a
given temporal duration.
Neuroimaging studies further substantiate the link between
sentient processing and time. Sentient processing has been asso-
ciated with the insular cortex. This structure receives input from
all senses including the somatosensory sense, which apart from
its role in touch informs about visceral, skeletal, and muscular
states. The insula has therefore been proposed as the seat for self-
awareness or consciousness (Craig, 2009a,b). Although, temporal
processing has been largely linked to striatal and prefrontal struc-
tures (Buhusi and Meck, 2005), the insula has been implicated as
well (Pouthas et al., 2005; Livesey et al., 2007; Wittmann et al.,
2010;f o rar e v i e ws e eWittmann, 2009). For example, Pouthas
et al. (2005) isolated insula activation both when comparing a
timing task with a control task and when comparing the timing of
long with short durations. Wittmann et al. (2010) further tested
the relationship between insular activation and time. They found
that this activation increased linearly with the encoded stimulus
duration. Based on this and the intricate connections between
insula and striatum (Chikama et al., 1997), one may venture that
the insula’s sentient computations support temporal perception
and potentially mediate the relationship between emotions and
time.
One such possible mediation could entail an inﬂuence
of emotion-induced bodily changes on sentient processing.
Speciﬁcally, such changes might heighten sentient processing and
self-awareness thereby contributing to an increased sensitivity to
the passage of time (Wittmann, 2009). Evidence in support of
this possibility is currently only indirect but nevertheless promis-
ing. First, researchers have shown that both bodily change and
sentience positively predict the duration of temporal estimates.
But more importantly, there seems to be a correlation between
both predictors. Individuals with a greater reduction in heart-
rate during timing trials tended to be better at guessing their
own heart-rate prior to the timing task (Meissner and Wittmann,
personal communication). A second line of support, for a link
between bodily changes and sentient processing comes from the
emotionliterature.Asdemonstratedrepeatedly,emotionalstimuli
elicit greater bodily changes than neutral stimuli (Bradley et al.,
2001) such that bodily changes may well account for associated
differences in the perception of time. Furthermore,meta-analyses
ﬁndtheinsulamorestronglyactivatedforemotionalascompared
toneutralevents,particularlywhenindividualsfocusonhowthey
feel (Phan et al., 2004; Lee and Siegle, 2009). Thus, one may infer
that emotion-induced bodily changes enhance sentient represen-
tations in the insula and that these representations are further
enhanced if bodily changes become the focus of attention. Lastly,
as t u d yb yEffron et al. (2006) speaks to the relationship between
bodily states, sentience, and time. These authors asked partici-
pants to perform a temporal bisection task with emotional and
neutral facial expressions in the test phase. In one condition, par-
ticipants were prevented from automatically embodying the facial
expression by holding a pen in their mouth. In another condition,
participants could move their face freely. Relative overestimations
foremotionalascomparedtoneutralexpressionswereonlyfound
in the latter condition suggesting that bodily representations are
critical for emotion effects on time.
Like the attentional proposal, the sentient proposal has a few
advantages over the arousal proposal. First, it outlines a concrete
mechanismandbrainsubstratebywhichemotionsinﬂuencetime.
As such, the proposal can be tested relatively easily. Second, it
tiesemotion-inducedtemporaldistortionstoprocessesthatoccur
while, not after, participants encode time. Speciﬁcally, while the
arousal proposal evokes sympathetic activations that often peak
after the timing stimulus has lapsed, the sentient proposal allows
foranybodilychangestoaffecttime.Hence,alsoparasympathetic
changes,suchasheart-ratedecelerationsthatoccuraftertheonset
of a timing stimulus, can affect temporal estimates. Neverthe-
less, the sentient proposal is not without problems. Speciﬁcally,
if one assumes that emotional stimuli lead to bodily changes and
thuspotentiallyheightensentientprocessingandtemporalaware-
ness, such stimuli should consistently produce longer temporal
estimates than neutral stimuli. However, emotional events may
both speed-up and slow-down subjective time relative to neutral
events and thus, by itself, this proposal also fails as an adequate
explanation.
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MODEL INTEGRATION
As usual, where there is conﬂict, reconciliation may be attempted
through a compromise of existing proposals. Such a compromise
could take different forms. One possibility is that the various
mechanisms identiﬁed here all support the relationship between
emotions and time and that their respective contributions vary
acrosssituationsand,perhaps,individuals.Forexample,theircon-
tributions may depend on the particular emotion that is evoked
by a timing stimulus or distractor. Fear relevant stimuli might
accelerate an internal clock by increasing bodily arousal, captur-
inganindividual’sattention(Pourtoisetal.,2006),andenhancing
sentient processing. Disgust relevant stimuli, on the other hand,
may decelerate an internal clock by biasing our attention away
from both the stimulus and its temporal dimension (Curtis et al.,
2004) in-spite of up-regulating sentient processing (Wicker et al.,
2003). Likewise different mechanisms may be at play depending
on whether emotional stimuli are the context or focus of the tim-
ing task and depending on stimulus duration. With respect to the
latter factor, one could envision emotion effects on attention to
be more acute during initial as compared to continued stimulus
processing thus leading to a drop-off of emotion effects for the
timing of longer stimuli.
Despite its ability to accommodate the data, the possibility
of situation-speciﬁc timing mechanisms is unsatisfying. It seems
too ﬂexible to have true explanatory power and thus one may
attempt to reconcile the literature by proposing a fourth, hybrid
mechanism with a more general utility. In light of the preceding
discussion it seems that the stimulus and the sentient processing
mechanismsarewellsuitedforthis.Speciﬁcally,alloneneedstodo
is accept the idea that sentient processing is stimulus-speciﬁc;that
weexperienceourselvesnotindependentlyfromourenvironment
butinrelationshiptothevariousstimuliandeventsweencounter.
Thus,wecreatestimulus-speciﬁcsentientandultimatelytemporal
representations.
Although speculative,this notion is not too far fetched because
there is already evidence that we can assign different temporal
values to equally long and temporarily overlapping stimuli (Pen-
ney et al.,2000). Speciﬁcally,two concurrent stimuli of equivalent
duration,butdifferinginmodalitymaybeperceivedasofdifferent
duration,therebyraisingthepossibilityof different(i.e.,stimulus-
speciﬁc)sentientrepresentations.Inthecontextof emotions,such
representationscouldaccountforbothrelativeoverandunderesti-
mationsobservedininterval-timingstudies.Asmentionedbefore,
overestimationswouldresultforemotionalascomparedtoneutral
timing stimuli due to an increase in sentient processing. Underes-
timations would result for neutral timing stimuli presented in the
contextofemotionalascomparedtoneutraldistractors.Here,sen-
tientrepresentationsemergingfromthetimingstimuluswouldbe
relatively weaker than the sentient representations emerging from
the emotional distractor, making the former seem shorter than it
really is.
T h eh y b r i dm o d e lp r o p o s e dh e r e( Figure 1) fairs better than
the arousal, attention, or sentient model alone in accommodat-
ing the existing data. Moreover, by making emotions relevant for
timing it solves the issue that attention to non-temporal neutral
information (e.g., intensity) impairs timing, whereas attention
FIGURE 1 | Illustrated is a potential mechanism by which emotions
may inﬂuence the perceived duration of external events. Depending on
their emotional signiﬁcance, environmental stimuli may trigger bodily
changes, which in turn may increase self-awareness or sentience – a
potential contributor to the perception of time. Depending on their
contribution to bodily and sentient changes, concurrent environmental
stimuli may be perceived as relatively longer (e.g., snake) or shorter (e.g.,
shrub) than their objective duration.
to non-temporal emotional information does not. It holds that
attending to emotions is similar to attending to time. Neverthe-
less, the model is at present highly speculative. It rests on a few
assumptions that have not yet been tested or for which exist-
ing evidence is still equivocal. For example, the assumption that
emotion-induced bodily changes enhance self-awareness awaits
investigation. This could be done by relating objective physio-
logical measures to self-reports of cardiac or respiratory activity
and to temporal judgments. Speciﬁcally, one could test whether
self-reports mediate the relationship between bodily change and
subjective time. Furthermore, the idea of stimulus-speciﬁc sen-
tient representations needs further investigation. The evidence
citedabovemerelysuggeststhatwecanperceiveconcurrentlypre-
sented same-duration stimuli as differently long. Whether and in
what way this is linked to different sentient representations and
whether emotions could differently moderate those are still open
issues.
CONCLUSION
Emotion-induced subjective changes in time are a ubiquitous
everyday phenomenon that is well documented in the literature.
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Different proposals have been put forth to explain how emo-
tions impact time. Of these proposals, a hybrid that combines
sentientandstimulusprocessingseemstobestaccommodateexist-
ing experimental data as it can account for why we sometimes
experience events to last longer and shorter than they really are.
Accordingtothisproposal,sucheventstriggerbodilychangesthat
increase our sense of“being”across time. The subjective duration
of objects that concur with such events then depends on how
much they share in sentience or awareness. Salient objects that
capture and hold attention would be overestimated relative to
other, less salient objects. Thus, differences in perceptual salience
wouldtranslateintodifferencesinmnemonicsalienceasthemore
important stimuli would receive greater temporal weights. As
such these objects may more readily inﬂuence present and future
behaviors.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I would like to thank Trevor Penney and Marc Wittmann
for commenting on an earlier version of this manuscript.
This work was supported by the NUS Yong Investigator
Award (WBS R581-000-066-101) and the A*Star SERC grant
(0921570130).
REFERENCES
Advokat, C. (2010). What are the cog-
nitive effects of stimulant med-
ications? Emphasis on adults with
attention-deﬁcit/hyperactivity dis-
order (ADHD). Neurosci. Biobehav.
Rev. 34, 1256–1266.
Angrilli, A., Cherubini, P., Pavese, A.,
and Mantredini, S. (1997). The
inﬂuence of affective factors on time
perception. Percept. Psychophys. 59,
972–982.
Bradley, M. M., Codispoti, M., Cuth-
bert, B. N., and Lang, P. J.
(2001). Emotion and motivation I:
defensive and appetitive reactions
in picture processing. Emotion 1,
276–298.
Brennan, A. R., and Arnsten, A. F.
T. (2008). Neuronal mechanisms
underlying attention deﬁcit hyper-
activity disorder: the inﬂuence of
arousal on prefrontal cortical func-
tion. Ann. N. Y. Acad. Sci. 1129,
236–245.
Buhusi, C. V., and Meck, W. H. (2005).
What makes us tick? Functional
and neural mechanisms of inter-
val timing. Nat. Rev. Neurosci. 6,
755–765.
Buhusi, C. V., and Meck, W. H.
(2009). Relative time sharing: new
ﬁndings and an extension of the
resource allocation model of tem-
poral processing. Philos. Trans.
R. Soc. Lond. B Biol. Sci. 364,
1875–1885.
Chikama,M.,McFarland,N.R.,Amaral,
D. G.,and Haber,S. N. (1997). Insu-
lar cortical projections to functional
regions of the striatum correlate
withcorticalcytoarchitectonicorga-
nization in the primate. J. Neurosci.
17, 9686–9705.
Craig, A. D. B. (2009a). Emotional
moments across time: a possible
neural basis for time perception in
the anterior insula. Philos. Trans.
R. Soc. Lond. B Biol. Sci. 364,
1933–1942.
Craig, A. D. B. (2009b). How do you
feel – now? The anterior insula and
human awareness. Nat. Rev. Neu-
rosci. 10, 59–70.
Curtis, V., Aunger, R., and Rabie,
T. (2004). Evidence that disgust
evolved to protect from risk of dis-
ease. Proc. R. Soc. B Biol. Sci. 271,
S131–S133.
Damasio, A. R. (1996). The somatic
marker hypothesis and the possible
functions of the prefrontal cortex.
Philos. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B Biol.
Sci. 351, 1413–1420.
Doi, H., and Shinohara, K. (2009). The
perceiveddurationofemotionalface
is inﬂuenced by the gaze direction.
Neurosci. Lett. 457, 97–100.
Droit-Volet, S. (2003). Alerting atten-
tionandtimeperceptioninchildren.
J. Exp. Child. Psychol. 85, 372–384.
Droit-Volet, S., Bigand, E., Ramos, D.,
andBueno,J.L.O.(2010).Timeﬂies
with music whatever its emotional
valence. Acta Psychol. (Amst.) 135,
226–232.
Droit-Volet, S., Fayolle, S. L., and
Gil, S. (2011). Emotion and time
perception: effects of ﬁlm-induced
mood. Front. Integr. Neurosci. 5:33.
doi:10.3389/fnint.2011.00033
Droit-Volet, S., and Gil, S. (2009).
The time-emotion paradox. Philos.
Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B Biol. Sci. 364,
1943–1953.
Droit-Volet,S.,andMeck,W.H.(2007).
How emotions colour our percep-
tionoftime.TrendsCogn.Sci.(Regul.
Ed.) 11, 504–513.
Effron, D. A., Niedenthal, P. M., Gil, S.,
and Droit-Volet, S. (2006). Embod-
iedtemporalperceptionof emotion.
Emotion 6, 1–9.
Gibbon,J.,Church,R.M.,andMeck,W.
H. (1984). Scalar timing in memory.
Ann. N. Y. Acad. Sci. 423, 52–77.
Gil, S., Niedenthal, P. M., and Droit-
Volet, S. (2007). Anger and time
perception in children. Emotion 7,
219–225.
Gil, S., Rousset, S., and Droit-Volet, S.
(2009).Howlikedanddislikedfoods
affect time perception. Emotion 9,
457–463.
Grommet, E. K., Droit-Volet, S., Gil,
S., Hemmes, N. S., Baker, A. H.,
and Brown, B. L. (2011). Time
estimation of fear cues in human
observers. Behav. Processes 86,
88–93.
Hicks, R. E., Miller, G. W., Gaes, G.,
and Bierman, K. (1977). Concur-
rent processing demands and the
experience of time-in-passing. Am.
J. Psychol. 90, 431–446.
James, W. (1981). The Principles of Psy-
chology. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press.
Lee, K.-H., Seelam, K., and O’Brien, T.
(2011). The relativity of time per-
ception produced by facial emo-
tion stimuli. Cogn. Emot. PMID:
21432628. [Epub ahead of print].
Lee,K.H.,andSiegle,G.J.(2009).Com-
mon and distinct brain networks
underlying explicit emotional eval-
uation: a meta-analytic study. Soc.
Cogn. Affect. Neurosci. Available at:
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pub
med/19270039 [Accessed July 14,
2011].
Levenson,R.W.,Ekman,P.,andFriesen,
W.V. (1990).Voluntary facial action
generates emotion-speciﬁc auto-
nomic nervous system activity. Psy-
chophysiology 27, 363–384.
Livesey,A.C.,Wall,M.B.,andSmith,A.
T. (2007). Time perception: manip-
ulation of task difﬁculty dissociates
clock functions from other cogni-
tive demands. Neuropsychologia 45,
321–331.
Lui, M. A., Penney, T. B., and Schirmer,
A. (2011). Emotion effects on tim-
ing: attention versus pacemaker
accounts. PLoS ONE 6, e21829.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0021829
Macar, F., Grondin, S., and Casini, L.
(1994).Controlledattentionsharing
inﬂuences time estimation. Mem.
Cognit. 22, 673–686.
Meck, W. H. (1983). Selective adjust-
ment of the speed of internal
clock and memory processes. J. Exp.
Psychol. Anim. Behav. Process. 9,
171–201.
Meissner,K.,andWittmann,M.(2011).
Body signals,cardiac awareness,and
the perception of time. Biol. Psychol.
86, 289–297.
Mella, N., Conty, L., and Pouthas, V.
(2011). The role of physiological
arousal in time perception: psy-
chophysiological evidence from an
emotion regulation paradigm. Brain
Cogn. 75, 182–187.
Noulhiane, M., Mella, N., Samson, S.,
Ragot, R., and Pouthas, V. (2007).
How emotional auditory stimuli
modulate time perception. Emotion
7, 697–704.
Ornstein, R. E. (1997). On the Experi-
ence of Time. Boulder,CO:Westview
Press.
Penney, T. B. (2003). “Modality differ-
ences in interval timing: attention,
clock speed, and memory,” in Func-
tional and Neural Mechanisms of
Interval Timing, ed. W. Meck (Boca
Raton, FL: CRC Press), 209–234.
Penney, T. B., Gibbon, J., and Meck,
W. H. (2000). Differential effects of
auditory and visual signals on clock
speed and temporal memory. J. Exp.
Psychol. Hum. Percept. Perform. 26,
1770–1787.
Phan, K. L., Wager, T. D., Taylor,
S. F., and Liberzon, I. (2004).
Functional neuroimaging studies of
human emotions. CNS Spectr. 9,
258–266.
Pourtois, G., Schwartz, S., Seghier, M.
L., Lazeyras, F., and Vuilleumier, P.
(2006). Neural systems for orient-
ingattentiontothelocationofthreat
signals:anevent-relatedfMRIstudy.
Neuroimage 31, 920–933.
Pouthas, V., George, N., Poline, J.-
B., Pfeuty, M., Vandemoorteele, P.-
F., Hugueville, L., Ferrandez, A.-
M., Lehéricy, S., Lebihan, D., and
Renault, B. (2005). Neural network
involvedintimeperception:anfMRI
study comparing long and short
interval estimation. Hum. Brain
Mapp. 25, 433–441.
Schirmer, A. (2004). Timing speech: a
review of lesion and neuroimaging
ﬁndings. Brain Res. Cogn. Brain Res.
21, 269–287.
Schirmer, A., and Escofﬁer, N. (2010).
Emotional MMN: anxiety and
heart rate correlate with the ERP
signature for auditory change
detection. Clin. Neurophysiol. 121,
53–59.
Frontiers in Integrative Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org October 2011 | Volume 5 | Article 58 | 5Schirmer How emotions change time
Schulman,C.A.,Richlin,M.,andWein-
stein, S. (1967). Hallucinations and
disturbances of affect, cognition,
and physical state as a function of
sensory deprivation. Percept. Mot.
Skills 25, 1001–1024.
Vierordt, K. (1868). Der Zeitsinn nach
Versuchen. Tubingen: H. Laupp.
Wearden, J. H., Pilkington, R., and
Carter,E.(1999).“Subjectivelength-
ening” during repeated testing of
a simple temporal discrimination.
Behav. Processes 46, 25–38.
Wicker, B., Keysers, C., Plailly, J., Royet,
J. P., Gallese, V., and Rizzolatti, G.
(2003). Both of us disgusted in my
insula: the common neural basis of
seeing and feeling disgust. Neuron
40, 655–664.
Wittmann, M. (2009). The inner
experience of time. Philos. Trans.
R. Soc. Lond. B Biol. Sci. 364,
1955–1967.
Wittmann,M.,Simmons,A. N.,Aron,J.
L., and Paulus, M. P. (2010). Accu-
mulation of neural activity in the
posterior insula encodes the pas-
sage of time. Neuropsychologia 48,
3110–3120.
Conﬂict of Interest Statement: The
author declares that the research was
conducted in the absence of any
commercial or ﬁnancial relationships
that could be construed as a potential
conﬂict of interest.
Received: 21 July 2011; paper pending
published: 09 August 2011; accepted: 14
September 2011; published online: 05
October 2011.
Citation: Schirmer A (2011) How emo-
tionschangetime.Front.Integr.Neurosci.
5:58. doi: 10.3389/fnint.2011.00058
Copyright © 2011 Schirmer. This is
an open-access article subject to a non-
exclusive license between the authors and
Frontiers Media SA, which permits use,
distribution and reproduction in other
forums,providedtheoriginalauthorsand
source are credited and other Frontiers
conditions are complied with.
Frontiers in Integrative Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org October 2011 | Volume 5 | Article 58 | 6